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Administrative and Constitutional Law
By PAUL OBERST* AND JEFFREY B. HUNT**
INTRODUCTION
This Survey covers significant developments in Kentucky's
public law, that general classification of law concerned with the
state in its political or sovereign capacity, including constitution-
al and administrative law. The section on administrative law
first discusses the rule of delegation, which is followed by an
analysis of administrative procedure in academe. The discussion
of constitutional law focuses on three subject areas: adult enter-
tainment activities, electroshock therapy and school expulsions.
I. ADMINISTRATIVE LAW
A. Delegating Powers-Legislative and judicial
The last Survey dealing with administrative law' in Ken-
tucky was devoted largely to recounting the development of the
rule against delegation. It started with a discussion of the "ad-
equate standards" test of the 1930s and the adoption of Professor
Davis' "safeguards" principle in the 1960s2 and thence to the cu-
rent muddle. Davis states the essence of his safeguards approach
as follows:
For the requirement of statutory standards, the courts should
substitute a reqirement of administrative standards, so that
an administrator will be forbidden to exercise discretionary
power in an individual case unless he has done what he reason-
ably can do to formulate, through rule making or otherwise,
standards to guide his determination.3
" Professor Emeritus, University of Kentucky. J.D. 1939, University of Kentucky;
LL.M. 1941, University of Michigan.
J.D. Candidate 1983, University of Kentucky.
1Rogers & Sims, Administrative Law, 69 Ky. L.J. 489 (1980-81).2 See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Associated Indus. of Ky., Inc., 370 S.W.2d 584 (Ky.
1963); Butler v. United Cerebral Palsy of N. Ky., 352 S.W.2d 203 (Ky. 1961).
3 K. DAVIS, ADMimSTRATIVE LAW OF THE SEVENTIES, SUPPLEMENTING ADMINISTRA-
TVE LAW TREATISE 20 (1976).
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This approach does not invalidate the statutory delegation, but
may invalidate particular administrative action.
In the 1976 case of Miller v. Covington Development
Authority,4 the Kentucky Supreme Court stated that it was rely-
ing on the safeguards test but invalidated the statute delegating
power to administrative development authorities for want of an
adequate standard in the statute for defining "economically sig-
nificant area" and because the Court found the delegation un-
necessary.5 The rule against delegation was further confounded
at all court levels last year in two cases involving a statute specif-
ically authorizing the Kentucky Human Rights Commission to
impose monetary damages for embarrassment and humiliation.
In Kentucky Commission on Human Rights v. Barbour,6 a case
concerning housing discrimination based on race, the Franklin
Circuit Court ruled the statute was void as an unconstitutional
delegation of power because the act'contained no "standards or
guidelines for the exercise of the discretion" and no "monetary
ceiling" on awards.1 On appeal, the Kentucky Court of Appeals
held that the rule against delegation had been expressly rejected
in 1961 and applied a five-pronged "safeguards" test, .one prong
of which was whether "the agency is required to establish criteria
for its decisions by issuing regulations." 8 It did not hold the stat-
ute unconstitutional. Instead, the case was remanded to the
Commission for "detailed written findings" to justify the dam-
ages originally awarded. The issuance of regulations establishing
criteria for Commission decisions was not required by the court. 9
The second case to consider the statute was Kentucky Commis-
sion on Human Rights v. Fraser,10 a sex discrimination action
4 539 S.W.2d 1 (Ky. 1976).
5 Id. at 4-5.
6 587 S.W.2d 849 (Ky. Ct. App. 1979), rev'd, 625 S.W.2d 860 (Ky. 1981).
7 587 S.W.2d at 850.
8 Id. at 851. See Butler v. United Cerebral Palsy of N. Ky., Inc., 352 S.W.2d at 203.
9 587 S.W.2d at 852 (In declimng to reach the constitutionality of KES §
344.230(3)(h), the court relied upon the absence of fact findings by the Commission to
support its decision to remand the case)..10 No. 80-CA-258-MR (Ky. Ct. App. Aug. 22, 1980) 27 Ky. L. SuMm. 11, at 4 [here-
mafter cited as KLS], rev'd, 625 S.W.2d 852 (Ky. 1981). Barbour and Fraser were com-
panion cases. Fraser contains the significant discussion while Barbour basically adopted
the reasomng and holding of Fraser.
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arising out of the dismissal of a female employee who became
pregnant. The Madison Circuit Court, like the Franklin Circuit
Court, held the statute unconstitutional, inter alia, for lack of
legislative standards for determining embarrassment and hu-
miliation.
The Kentucky Supreme Court reversed both cases in 1981.11
The statute was upheld against the non-delegation attacks on the
ground that the statute adequately defined the prohibited con-
duct. A previous Survey article concluded that in Barbour and
Fraser the Court had reaffirmed the "safeguards" test as the
proper test in applying the nondelegation doctrine. 2 However, a
more recent Kentucky Supreme Court decision indicates that the
"adequate standards" test is still all too alive and well and avail-
able for use in invalidating legislative delegations. Moreover, the
Court emphasized another new rule from Miller v. Covington
Development Authority"3 enabling courts to invalidate delega-
tions which the legislature believed necessary, if the courts con-
clude the delegations were not necessary in light of "the practical
needs of effective government.."' 4
The issue in a recent Kentucky Supreme Court decision in
this area, City of Covington v. Covington Lodge No. 1, F. O.P.,15
was the legality of a binding arbitration clause in a collective
bargaining agreement between the city and a police union. The
clause was held to violate the rule against delegation. The Ken-
tucky Supreme Court's opinion cited a 1903 case, for the rule
prohibiting all delegations of legislative powers and then cited
Miller v. Covington Development Authority for the proposition
that legislative powers may not be delegated except in cases of
"clear necessity,"' 7 thus avoiding any mention of either "ad-
equate standards" or "safeguards." Therefore, the Court appar-
11 Kentucky Comm'n on Human Rights v. Barbour, 625 S.W.2d 860 (Ky. 1981);
Kentucky Cornm'n on Human Rights v. Fraser, 625 S.W.2d 852 (Ky. 1981).
12 Rogers & Sims, supra note 1, at 516.
13 539 S.W.2d at 1.
11 Id. at4.
'5 622 S.W.2d 221 (Ky. 1981).
16 Lowery v. City of Lexington, 75 S.W. 202 (Ky. 1903). The Court also cited City
of Bowling Green v. Gaines, 96 S.W. 852 (Ky. 1906).
17 622 S.W.2d at 222.
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ently has, at least for cases with facts similar to those in Coving-
ton Lodge, embraced a different test than the "safeguards" test
supposedly settled on in Barbour and Fraser.
The rule that judicial powers may not be conferred upon or
exercised by the political branches is an associated but distinct
proposition from the non-delegation rule. It has long been con-
ceded that administrative agencies may exercise "quasi-judicial"
powers when hearing disputes and making decisions.18 In Bar-
bour and Fraser, a second line of attack was that the imposition
of a monetary penalty in racial or sex discrimination cases for
embarrassment and humiliation was an "unconstitutional
usurpation of judicial power."' 9 While the circuit court in Bar-
bour seemed to believe that legislative imposition of a monetary
ceiling on damages for embarrassment and humiliation would
somehow avoid the usurpation,21 the Fraser circuit court implied
that only judges could ever constitutionally impose variable
penalties, a peculiarly judicial function.21
The Kentucky Supreme Court opinion in both Barbour and
Fraser laid the matter to rest by pointing out in Fraser that "[a]d-
ministrative agencies are frequently involved in the adjudication
of disputes '' and that "Itihe substantial trend of authority ex-
tends administrative powers of adjudiction to encompass the
award of damages." The Court further stated: "We find noth-
ing unconstitutional in the administrative award of damages
under this statute where due process procedural rights have been
protected, where prohibited conduct has been well defined by
the governing statute, and where judicial review is available."'
The Court in Fraser also expressly held that the Kentucky
Constitution does not require a monetary ceiling to be set for the
award of damages for humiliation or embarrassment. 25 Since
18 See 1 K. DAVIS, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TREATISE § 3:10 (2d ed. 1978 & Supp.
1982).
19 625 S.W.2d at 855.
2' 587 S.W.2d at 850.21 No. 80-CA-258-MR, slip op. at 15.
2 625 S.W.2d at 854.
2Id. at 855.
241d.
25 Id.
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there is no dollar limit and the concepts of humiliation and em-
barrassment are not easy to quantify, an administrative body is
just as qualified as a jury in "assessing similarly intangible ele-
ments of injury, such as pain and suffering and loss of consor-
tium, without dollar limits. As long as judicial review is available
there is no inherent evil in committing the same fact-finding
function to an administrative body." The Court found two ad-
vantages in conferring this power to impose monetary penalties
without dollar limits: "In such cases a specific limit could itself
be arbitrary, and the agency's experience in gauging similar cases
gives it a range of reasonable awards which may help to make the
agency less susceptible to an unreasonable finding than an inex-
perienced jury might be." 7
B. Administrative Procedure in Academe
State universities are no doubt public agencies, but with dif-
ferences-they are not headed by commissioners or staffed by
bureaucracy. Indeed, in order to insulate them as far as possible
from the day to day pressures of the political branches, univer-
sities have been equipped like private institutions with indepen-
dent boards of trustees or regents2 and staffed with a president,
administration, faculty and employees. They operate under gen-
eral statutory powers, pieced together to some extent by govern-
ing regulations, administrative regulations and Senate Rules.
Through the years, much university administration has been
passed by fiat, resulting in little attention being paid to due pro-
cess procedures.
More recently, the United States Constitution has come to
the campus.29 Courts have imposed procedural due process re-
2 Id.
2 7 Id.
' Trustees and regents are appointed by the Governor, but are given fixed terms and
can be removed only for cause. KY. REv. STAT. § 164.320 (Bobbs-Merrill Cum. Supp.
1982) [hereinafter cited as KRS]. Terms were increased from four to six years in 1980 and
are staggered to encourage stability and to further discourage influence from the political
branches. Some trustees may influence policy over the years, but characteristically the
boards are dominated by strong presidents, who make most university policy under dele-
gation from the boards.
29 See Wright, The Constitution on the Campus, 22 VAND. L. REv. 1027 (1969).
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quirements in cases of student expulsions0 and faculty
dismissals,3 but the question of proper procedures for the dismis-
sal of a university president during a term of office had never
arisen in Kentucky until February of 1981,32 at Murray State Uni-
versity. Not surprisingly, there was a lack of clear-cut regulations
and precedents. A fierce battled erupted, and the dispute went
three times to the Kentucky Court of Appeals and twice to the
Kentucky Supreme Court. The only published opinion, however,
is a brief one by the court of appeals, which reversed the circuit
court decision ordering a hearing and voided the hearing on the
ground of failure to exhaust administrative remedies.-" The case
does deserve full reporting, because it may well be a milestone on
the path from arbitrary procedures to an era of creeping legalism
in the universities. '
Murray State University President Curris was midway
through his third four-year term of office when on February 22,
1981, the Board of RegentsO voted six to four to consider his re-
moval for cause and set a hearing for March 28. The Board ap-
pointed the University attorneye to investigate and formulate
Wright discusses Dixon v. Alabama State Bd. of Educ., 294 F.2d 150 (5th Cir.), cert. de-
nied, 368 U.S. 930 (1961).
30 See Board of Curators of Univ. of Mo. v. Horowitz, 435 U.S. 78 (1978). For a dis-
cussion of a recent Kentucky decision concerning due process in student expulsion cases,
see text accompanying notes 109-133 infra.
31 Compare Board of Regents of State Colleges v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564 (1972) (nonten-
ured teacher has no constitutional right to a hearing before nonrenewal of contract absent
a showing that liberty was deprived or that a property interest existed in continued em-
ployment) with Perry v. Sinderman, 408 U.S. 593 (1972) (proof of implied tenure from an
institution's policies and practices would be sufficient property interest in continued em-
ployment to require a hearing).
32 The Louisville Courier-Journal, Feb. 23, 1981, at Al, col. 5 (Kentucky edition).
The Curris-Board of Regents saga is chronicled in the Courier-Journal from 1981-83.
33 Board of Regents of Murray State Univ. v. Curris, 620 S.W.2d 322 (Ky. Ct. App.
1981).
4 The board of regents consists of 10 regents, eight appointed by the governor for
six-year terms and one each elected by the faculty for a three-year term and by the stu-
dents for a one-year term. KRS § 164.320 (Cum. Supp. 1982).
W KRS § 164.360(3) (1980) provides that "no president or faculty member shall be
removed except for incompetency, neglect of or refusal to perform his duty, or for im-
moral conduct." Provision is made for a 10-day written notice of the nature of the charges,
a hearing before the Board by counsel or otherwise and introduction of testimony. See The
Louisville Courier-Journal, Feb. 23, 1981, at Al, col. 5 (Kentucky Edition).
6 KRS § 164.360(3) (1980) provides in part: "Charges against a president shall be
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charges and suspended the president from all but ceremonial
functions. Curris promptly brought suit in the Calloway Circuit
Court to enjoin five of the six regents who had voted for the hear-
ing from participating in it on the grounds of prejudice.17 The
presiding circuit judge disqualified himself and Judge J. Paul
Keith of Jefferson County was appointed Special Judge.
On March 23, Judge Keith began a hearing on the Curris in-
junction action. After all ten regents testified, he ruled on March
24 that four of the five regents who had been sued, including the
one student and one faculty regent, should be barred from the
Board hearing because of their bias against Curris. The six re-
maining regents (the chairperson, the one other regent who had
voted for the hearing, and the four regents opposing the hearing)
were left to constitute a quorum for the March 28 hearing.,s Last
ditch efforts by the Board's attorney to block the Board hearing,
on the grounds of Curris' failure to exhaust his administrative
remedies before seeking judicial relief, were denied on March 27
by both the court of appeals and the Supreme Court on the
ground that the hearing before the six-member Board did not
threaten irreparable injury to the University. 39 However, the
press reported that Chief Justice Palmore had suggested in the
course of the argument before the Kentucky Supreme Court that
"'the orderly thing' for the Board to do was to delay the hearing,
because the courts might later 'come along and say it was all for
naught.' "40
preferred by the chairman of the board upon written information furnished to him." The
chairperson at the time, Ron Christopher, was a practicing attorney in Murray, Ken-
tucky. The Board voted to employ an independent Murray law firm and a Bowling Green
accounting firm to investigate and present the charges. Fourteen charges were originally
submitted to Curris on Feb. 22, 1981; eight were dropped and three were added at a
March 14 meeting of the Board. The use of outside investigators was attacked as an unlaw-
ful expense, but offered the advantage of some "separation of functions" which has been a
frequent goal in administrative hearings.
37 The chairperson, who also had voted for the hearing, was not sued. The Louisville
Courier-Journal, Mar. 26, 1981, at B1, col. 1 (Kentucky Late Edition).38 Id.
39 Board of Regents of Murray State Univ. v. Honorable J. Paul Keith, Jr., No. 81-
SC-382-MR, slip. op., (Ky. June 16, 1981).
40 The Louisville Courier-Journal, Mar. 28, 1981, at BI, col. 1 (Kentucky Late Edi-
tion).
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Nonetheless, the hearing began the next day before the bob-
tailed board of six regents. At the outset, Curris' attorney tried
unsuccessfully to unseat the chairperson and the Board's attorney
made similar unsuccessful attempts to unseat three of the pro-
Curris regents. Later, six charges were withdrawn; 4' the remain-
ing three were dismissed at the end of the hearing by the not sur-
prising vote of 4-2. Thereupon, the full Board met and promptly
voted 10-0 to restore Curris to his duties.
This was not, however, the end of the legal battle. On July 3,
the court of appeals held that Judge Keith's judgment barring
four Board members for bias was an abuse of discretion and re-
versed his decision on the ground of failure to exhaust adminis-
trative remedies. 42 The appellate court held that the claims of
bias did not justify premature resort to the court, since adequate
relief for bias, if necessary, could be providedfollowing proceed-
ings before the Board. 43 On August 27, the Kentucky Supreme
Court denied a motion to vacate the court of appeals ruling; the
three-day hearing by the bobtailed Board was indeed "for
naught," as Chief Justice Palmore had earlier suggested."
The Curris decision, of course, is a victory for the principle of
exhaustion of administrative remedies. As the court of appeals
pointed out, exhaustion is not required if no adequate relief can
be afforded following the administrative proceedings. However,
the court concluded that judicial review of the bias claim follow-
ing an administrative hearing would afford adequate relief.
Surely the record of the administrative hearing would afford a
firmer basis for a judicial decision on impartiality than specula-
tion before the event about possible bias of regents. An addition-
al reason for the decision may have been the subject matter.
Courts are reluctant to intervene in the affairs of educational in-
stitutions if intervention can be avoided.
41 The reason given by the University's attorney for withdrawal of the charges was
that "some key witnesses would not testify unless they were quaranteed [sic] no retaliation
by the board." The Louisville Courier-Journal, Mar. 31, 1981, at B1, col. 6 (Late Ken-
tucky Edition).
42 Board of Regents of Murray State Univ. v. Curris, 620 S.W.2d at 322.
43 Id.
44 A new hearing before the full Board was obviously in order, but a temporary
peace had set in. The six to four majority in favor of the hearing was reduced to a five tp
five split by the election of a pro-Curris student. In the face of a possible deadlock, no new
hearing was scheduled.
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The more important administrative law issue decided by the
Kentucky Court of Appeals in Curis was the issue of disqualifi-
cation of hearing officers for lack of impartiality. The law recog-
nizes three types of disqualifying taint: interest, pre-judgment
and personal bias.45 "Interest" must involve the prospect of per-
sonal gain or loss-either pecuniary 6 or otherwise resulting from
having played the role of advocate in the same case.47 Disqualify-
ing "pre-judgment" involves predetermination of adjudicative
facts involved. In Curris, neither "interest" nor "pre-judgment"
were found to be in issue, even though the Board which heard
the charges was the same Board which had preferred them.
48
Finally, "bias," to be disqualifying, must involve partiality-an
inclination to favor one party more than another strongly enough
to cause unfairness. 49
The trial court reached the strange conclusion that four of
the five regents proposing to hear charges were biased while all
of those who opposed a hearing were not. The Kentucky Court of
Appeals on review pointed out that each enjoined regent testified
in court that he had not prejudged the case and would vote on re-
moval based solely on evidence presented at the hearing. The
court further found that the determination of bias by Judge
Keith was a conjectural finding of potential bias made in ad-
vance of the hearing, and that there is a presumption of honesty
and integrity of members of state administrative agencies. 50
45 K. DAVIS, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TREATISE SUPPLEMENT §§ 19:4-:6 (1980).
46 Id. § 19:6. Tumey v. Ohio, 273 U.S. 510 (1927), is the classic case on disqualifying
"interest." In the more recent case of Gibson v. BerryhiU, 411 U.S. 564 (1973), the United
States Supreme Court voided a decision of the Alabama Board of Optometrists, composed
entirely of independent practitioners, which suspended all optometrists engaged in corpor-
ate practice for unprofessional conduct. The practice of optometry in the state was almost
evenly split between independent and corporate optometrists and the independents would
have fallen heir to the entire practice of the corporate optometrists had the suspension
been upheld.
47 Here it is not money, but personal pride involved. One who has prosecuted is pre-
sumed to persist in the role of advocate.4 8
"Multiplicity of functions" is frequently attacked, but, as Professor Davis points
out, "[a]lthough at least eleven United States Supreme Court opinions have dealt with
problems about separation of functions, the Court has never held a system of combined
functions to be a violation of due process." 3 K. DAVIS, supra note 18, at § 18:2 (2d ed.
1980).
49 K. DAvis, supra note 45, at § 19:5.
'5 620 S.W.2d at 323. Judge Keith apparently gave great weight to a breakfast meet-
1982-83]
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In May of 1982, the Board at Murray State University voted
five to four to notify Curris that his contract would not be re-
newed upon its expiration date in 1983 and to begin a nation-
wide search for a new president." After a new dispute between
the Board and the president in late July of 1982 concerning cer-
tain appointments, the Governor requested the resignation of the
seven appointed regents so that he might appoint eight new re-
gents who could work in harmony. Four regents did resign, but
the chairperson and two regents declined the Governor's invi-
tation.52 The Governor finally appointed five new regents on
August 30.0 The reconstituted Board promptly affirmed the
decision to search for a new president. President Curris an-
nounced first that he would not "seek" reappointment aid final-
ly that he would not accept a reappointment if it were tendered.
The Governor's request for resignations raised the new and
different question of balance between gubernatorial executive
power and university board independence. The chairperson and
director of the Council on Higher Education approved the Gov-
ernor's call for resignations, as did the chairperson of the Com-
mittee on the Future of Higher Education in Kentucky. The fac-
ulty trustees and regents of the seven other Kentucky universities
and the Executive Committee of the Kentucky Conference of
American Association of University Professors chapters endorsed
the position of the regents who refused the invitation to resign.
Again, the underlying issue was one of university independence,
this time in the face of the call for efficient administration.
It was reported that the Board at Murray State University
had no by-laws and operated on ad hoc rulings by the chairper-
son subject to appeal to the entire Board. Perhaps one of the prin-
ing of several regents at "Granny's Porch" restaurant on the morning of Feb. 7, 1981, pre-
ceding the Board meeting. Similarly, at the Board's March 28 hearing, the special attorney
of the Board sought removal of three regents who had opposed the hearing on the ground
that they had talked with Curris or met with him and among themselves to discuss the
charges.
51 In April of 1982, the five to five deadlock on the Board was broken by the resigna-
tion of Regent Settle. He was succeeded by George N. King on April 30. At the May 23
Board meeting, Regent King did not vote. He resigned in late June of 1982.
52 The Louisville Courier-Journal, Aug. 12, 1982, at Al, col. 2 (Kentucky Late Edi-
tion).
53 The Louisville Courier-Journal, Aug. 31, 1982, at Al, col. 5 (Metro Edition).
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cipal points to be made in this Survey is not the importance of ex-
haustion of administrative remedies, nor analysis of the require-
ment of an impartial hearing examiner, nor even the importance
of saving the independence of state universities from inroads by
legislatures, administrative bodies and courts. Rather, it is that
in a Commonwealth which has no general code of administrative
procedure, 54 each institution should enact full and fair by-laws or
regulations governing the procedures of its boards and adminis-
tration and faculty so that resort to legal remedies-legislative,
judicial or administrative-can be avoided as much as possible.
II. CONSTITUTnONAL LAW
A. Adult Entertainment Activities
In Mr. B's Bar and Lounge, Inc. v. City of Louisville,rs the
Kentucky Court of Appeals held valid a city ordinance which
provided for modest regulation of adult entertainment activ-
ities.-" The Louisville Board of Aldermen had enacted a muni-
cipal ordinance regulating outdoor signs which advertised cer-
tain "adult entertainment activities" and which required licens-
5 In federal administrative law, there is a general code of administrative proce-
dure-the Federal Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. §§ 551-59 (1976 & Supp. II
1978). Following the lead of the federal system, more than 30 states have adopted a state
Administrative Procedure Act. See REVISED MODEL STATE ADMIN. PROCEDURE AcT (Na-
tional Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws 1961), 14 U.L.A. 357 (1980).
See also id. at prefatory note.
Kentucky does not have a general code of administrative procedures for rulemak-
ing, judicial review of administrative decisions, exhaustive review of administrative
agency decisions, adjudicatory powers of administrative agencies and investigatory
powers of agencies. Rather, KRS chapter 13, KRS §§ 13.075-.125 (1980 & Cum. Supp.
1982) describes only the rulemaking procedures for administrative agencies.
For an excellent discussion of administrative law in the states, see Bonfield, The
Definition of Formal Agency Adjudication Under the Iowa Administrative Procedure Act,
63 IowA L. REV. 285 (1977); Bonfield, The Iowa Administrative Procedure Act: Back-
ground, Construction, Applicability, Public Access to Agency Law, The Rulemaking Pro-
cess, 60 IowA L. REV. 731 (1975); Bonfield, State Law in the Teaching of Administrative
Law: A Critical Analysis of the Status Quo, 61 TEx. L. REv. 95 (1982).
'5 630 S.W.2d 564 (Ky. Ct. App. 1981), discretionary review denied, 29 KLS 4, at 9
(Ky. Apr. 13, 1982).
56 Louisville, Ky., Ordinance 69 (1977) gives the Director of the Public Health and
Safety Cabinet power to license and regulate "adult entertainment activities." Id. at 565.
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ing of seven types of adult entertainment at a small fee. 57 The
ordinance does not prohibit adult entertainment activities,ss nor
zone them. 59 Mr. B's Bar and Lounge, along with several other
"topless go-go bars," 6 filed suit against Louisville and the Direc-
tor of Public Health and Safety Cabinet challenging the classifi-
cation of these business activities as "cabarets,""' which are
among the regulated adult activities.
'7 Louisville, Ky., Ordinance 69, § 1(e) (1977) requires that seven classifications of
adult entertainment activities be licensed and the signs advertising the businesses be strict-
ly regulated. The seven classifications are:
1. Adult bookstore.
2. Adult motion picture theatre.
3. Adult vending motion picture theatre.
4. Adult stage show theatre.
5. Cabaret.
6. Adult amusement arcade.
7. Commercial sexual entertainment center.
630 S.W.2d at 565. The fee charged for the license is $250. Id. at 568.
8 See Louisville, Ky. Ordinance 69, § l(e). In contrast, the Newport, Kentucky,
City Council recently passed an ordinance banning nude dancing. The ordinance requires
the strippers to wear G-strings or pasties as well as submit to picture taking and finger-
printing. Local club owners in Newport have filed suit in the United States District Court
for the Eastern District of Kentucky.
59 Several United States Supreme Court decisions permit state regulation through
zoning of adult entertainment activities. See, e.g., Young v. American Mini Theatres,
Inc., 427 U.S. at 50; Doran v. Salem Inn, Inc., 422 U.S. 922 (1975); Paris Adult Theatre I
v. Slaton, 413 U.S. 49 (1973). The Court in Young v. American Mini Theatres, Inc. per-
mitted Detroit to zone 10 different kinds of adult entertainment even though the "adult
materials" presented were not considered obscene under Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15
(1973) and Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476 (1957).
The Young Court emphasized that "[e]ven though the First Amendment protects
communication in this area from total suppression, we hold that the state may legitimate-
ly use the content of these materials as the basis for placing them in a different classifica-
tion from other motion pictures." 427 U.S. at 70-71. Although limited first amendment
protection may be extended to nude dancing itself, since nude dancing may be only "sym-
bolic speech," there is no absolute first amendment protection. See United States v.
O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367 (1968) (burning a draft card is "symbolic speech" and conduct is not
absolutely protected by the first amendment). In O'Brien, the Court held that "symbolic
speech" or other expressive conduct receives no absolute first amendment protection, thus
any "important or substantial governmental interest" for regulation of such speech would
not infringe on first amendment rights. Id. at 376-77. For a discussion of regulation or pro-
hibition of topless dancing, see Comment, Topless Dancing and the Constitution: A New
York Town's Experience, 25 BUFFALO L. RaV. 753 (1976). See generally Edelstein & Mott,
Collateral Problems in Obscenity Regulation: A Uniform Approach to Prior Restraints,
Community Standards, and judgment Preclusion, 7 SETON HALL L. REv. 543 (1976);
Marcus, Zoning Obscenity: or, the Moral Politics of Porn, 27 BUFFALo L. REv. 1 (1978).
6o 630 S.W.2d at 565.
61 Id. The Director of the Public Health and Safety Cabinet of Louisville placed the
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The Jefferson County Circuit Court entered a summary
judgment in favor of the city.62 The Kentucky Court of Appeals
affirmed the summary judgment and sustained the ordinance
against numerous constitutional attacks. 3 The bars first alleged
that the ordinance was overly broad as applied to them since it
"arbitrarily and discriminatorily placed [them] in a classification
of pornography dealers." The court of appeals rejected this
argument, noting that the ordinance only regulates "adult enter-
tainment activities" and not "pornography as such."' The court
explained that, whether or not topless go-go dancing is con-
sidered pornographic, the city has a legitimate interest in reg-
ulating cabarets and the other businesses covered by the ordi-
nance since they all have a common thread: they are "clearly
plaintiffs' businesses under the ordinances § l(e)(5) definition of "cabaret," thereby acti-
vating the license fee and the regulation of advertising signs.
62 Id. at 565.
63 Id. at 568. The bars claimed that the ordinance was invalid because the findings
on which it was based were erroneous. Id. at 565. The preamble to the ordinance included
findings that "certain adult entertainment activities have contributed to an increased inci-
dence of crime and juvenile delinquency." Id. The court of appeals rejected this argu-
ment, stating that since the quoted language appears in the preamble to the ordinance, the
bars could not challenge the findings. "The preamble to a piece of legislation is generally
held not to be an essential part of the legislation." Id. The court further stated that the
challenge to the findings "basically consists of a questioning of the public policy on which
the Board of Aldermen based its action." As such, the proper forum for challenging the
policy was the legislature and not the court. See Fann v. McGuffey, 435 S.W.2d 770 (Ky.
1975); Jasper v. Commonwealth, 375 S.W.2d 709 (Ky. 1964); Louisville Memorial Gar-
dens, Inc. v. Carpenter, 261 S.W.2d 627 (Ky. 1953).
The plaintiffs also alleged that the Kentucky Alcoholic Beverage Control Board's
regulation of alcohol-serving establishments preempted any city regulations. The court of
appeals rejected this argument, stating that although alcohol is a state regulated matter,
the city's ordinance did not regulate the establishments for serving alcohol; rather, the
ordinance regulated the bars only for the aspect of "adult entertainment activities." 630
S.W.2d at 566. Interestingly, the twenty-first amendment provides the Kentucky Alco-
holic Beverage Control Board with plenary power to regulate or even prohibit adult sex-
ual entertainment activities at these bars. See California v. LaRue, 409 U.S. 109 (1973)
(twenty-first amendment, which grants the states plenary power over alcohol, also grants
broad discretion to the states in regulating liquor establishments-including the total pro-
hibition of adult sexual entertainment activities within these liquor establishments).
For an excellent discussion of California v. LaRue, see Comment, Nude Dancing
Protected Under Limited Circumstances in Establishments Serving Alcoholic Beverages-
Commonwealth v. Sees, 78 Mass. Adv. Sh. 536, 373 N.E.2d 1151 (1978), 13 SUFFOLK
U.L. REv. 162 (1979).
'4 630 S.W.2d at 566.
5 Id.
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sexually-oriented entertainments... and as such, they involve
similar problems of regulation." The city's interests are the pro-
tection of children from juvenile delinquency and the control of
crimeY6 Because the "classification has a rational basis, that is,
the unique problems involved in advertising adult entertainment
activities," nothing prevents the city from regulating these busi-
nesses.
The court rejected another argument made by the bars relat-
ing to their classification as "cabarets." The bars argued that
placing them in a classification different from other businesses
which sell alcoholic beverages was discriminatory and violated
the equal protection clause; the court again noted that the classi-
fication had a rational basis-the special problems of regulating
adult entertainment activities-and thus was not an unconstitu-
tional discrimination.
The bars further contended that an ordinance that tells them
what types of signs may be used in front of their adult entertain-
ment establishments constitutes a taking of property without due
process of law. 70 The ordinance prohibits businesses in the adult
entertainment classification from using signs with "lettering,
wording, pictorial or representational matter characterized by
emphasis on matter relating to sexual activities." 71 The court
summarily rejected this due process argument by stating that the
ordinance did not require a physical transfer of any existing signs
to the local government; therefore, there was no "taking. 72
Although the court is correct in denying a "taking" argu-
ment, the court's view of the "taking" issue fails to consider the
affect of land use regulation on property. The court of appeals
opinion is consistent with early United States Supreme Court
cases which held that only a physical appropriation by the state
6 lId.
6 Id. at 565.
8 Id. at 567.
69 d.
70 Id. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1 provides: "No state shall deprive any person of
life, liberty or property without due process of law."
71 630 S.W.2d at 567. The thrust of the ordinance is regulation of the signs advertis-
ing adult entertainment activities.
72 Id.
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equalled a "taking" requiring the state to pay the landowner just
compensation.73 However, this view was rejected in 1922 by the
Supreme Court in Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon. That case
involved a state mining statute which prohibited mining of coal
in a manner causing subsidence 75 of certain types of improved
property. Justice Holmes, writting for the majority, stated that
"when [regulation] reaches a certain magnitude, in most if not in
all cases there must be an exercise of eminent domain and com-
pensation to sustain the act."76 The state can regulate and pro-
vide for land use controls. However, if the regulation or prohibi-
tion goes so far that there is a taking, then the injured landowner
must be compensated. 7 The sign regulation involved in Mr. B's is
consistent with holding no compensation is due under property
use regulations where the state has a substantial interest in public
health, safety, morals or general welfare. 78
Another ground of attack by the bars was that the use of signs
in front of the businesses constituted speech within the protection
of the first amendment. 79 In recent years, the United States
Supreme Court has denominated advertising as "commercial
speech." 0 The bars in Mr. B's alleged that the regulation of their
73 See, e.g., Mugler v. Kansas, 123 U.S. 623 (1887).
74 260 U.S. 393 (1922).
75 Subsidence means ground sinking.
76 260 U.S. at 413.
77 Id. at 414. For a recent discussion of the "taking" issue in a zoning context, see
Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. New York, 438 U.S. 104 (1978).
78 See, e.g., Nectow v. City of Cambridge, 277 U.S. 183, 188 (1928); Village of
Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365 (1926).
79 630 S.W.2d at 567.
80 See Ohralik v. Ohio State Bar Ass'n, 436 U.S. 447 (1978); In re Primus, 436 U.S.
412 (1978); National Society of Professional Engr v. United States, 435 U.S. 679 (1978);
Bates v. State Bar of Ariz., 433 U.S. 350 (1977); Linmark Assoc., Inc. v. Township of Wil-
lingboro, 431 U.S. 85 (1977); Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Con-
sumer Council, Inc., 425 U.S. 748 (1976); Bigelow v. Virginia, 421 U.S. 809 (1975); Pitts-
burgh Press Co. v. Pittsburgh Comm'n on Human Rights, 413 U.S. 376 (1973); New York
Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964); Breard v. City of Alexandria, 341 U.S. 622 (1951);
Martin v. City of Struthers, 319 U.S. 141 (1943); Murdock v. Pennsylvania, 319 U.S. 105
(1943); Valentine v. Chrestensen, 316 U.S. 52 (1942); Capital Broadcasting Co. v. Mit-
chell, 333 F. Supp. 582 (D.D.C. 1971), affd without opinion sub noa., Capital Broad-
casting Co. v. Acting Attorney Gen. Kleindienst, 405 U.S. 1000 (1971). See also Black, He
Cannot Choose But Hear: The Plight of the Captive Auditor, 53 COLum. L. REV. 960
(1953); Note, Freedom of Expression in a Commercial Context, 78 HAv. L. REV. 1191
(1965).
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signs violated their first amendment right of free speech. Relying
on the United States Supreme Court's holding in Young v. Amer-
ican Mini Theatres that "reasonable regulations of the time,
place, and manner of protected speech, where those regulations
are necessary to further significant governmental interests, are
permitted by the First Amendment," the Kentucky court held
The Court in Valentine v. Chrestensen first delineated the scope of what became
known as the "commercial speech" doctrine. It interpreted the first amendment as exclud-
ing commercial speech from any protection:
This court has unequivocally held that the streets are proper places for the
exercise of the freedom of communicating information and disseminating
opinion and that, though the states and municipalities may appropriately
regulate the privilege in the public interest, they may not unduly burden or
proscribe its employment in these public thoroughfares. We are equally
clear that the Constitution imposes no such restraint on government as re-
spects purely commercial advertising.
316 U.S. at 54.
More recently, the Supreme Court has extended first amendment protection to
what Valentine v. Chrestensen termed "commercial speech." In a series of three decisions
made in the mid-1970s, the Court reinterpreted Chrestensen and rejected the commercial
speech doctrine, thus allowing some first amendment protection for advertising. See Vir-
ginia State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Council, Inc., 425 U.S. at 748; Bigelow
v. Virginia, 421 U.S. at 809; Pittsburgh Press Co. v. Pittsburgh Comm'n on Human
Rights, 413 U.S. at 376. In Pittsburgh Press, for example, the Court noted that "the ex-
change of information is as important in the commercial realm as in any other." 413 U.S.
at 388. The states cannot prohibit such speech when the underlying commercial activity is
legal. Bigelow v. Virginia, 421 U.S. at 822 (referring to advertisements for abortion
clinics). The Court, however, allows states to regulate the time, manner and place of pro-
tected speech. See Young v. American Mini Theatres, 427 U.S. 50 (1976).
States may totally prohibit speech "when the commercial activity itself is illegal."
Pittsburgh Press Co. v. Pittsburgh Comm'n on Human Rights, 413 U.S. at 389. Thus, the
state may regulate "speech," such as the signs involved in Mr. B's Bar & Lounge v. City of
Louisville, but cannot prohibit such speech unless it is illegal.
Another attack made by the bars was that the advertising sign ordinance was an
improperly enacted zoning ordinance. In the context of land and zoning regulations, the
United States Supreme Court has granted cities wide discretion. See Village of Euclid v.
Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. at 365. In Ambler Realty, the Supreme Court recognized
zoning as a valid method of land use planning. Arising out of this case was a line of cases
permitting regulation of signs and billboards for business advertising purposes under the
guise of community interests and rational exercise of state police powers (as in Mr. B's, the
reasons were to prevent crime and juvenile delinquency). See P. RoHAN, ZONINc AND
LAND USE CONTROLS § 16.01 (1981); Masotti & Selfon, Aesthetic Zoning and the Police
Power, 46 J. URBAN L. 773 (1969).
The United States Supreme Court's decision in Young v. American Mini Theatres,
Inc., 427 U.S. at 50, relates to both the first amendment and the zoning issues. This case
adopts the view that the state and city can have sufficient interests to restrict the time,
place and manner of protected speech. Therefore, the Kentucky Court of Appeals correct-
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the regulation did not violate the first amendment.,' The court
did not expressly state the interests which were sufficient for first
amendment purposes. It did note, in another portion of the opin-
ion, that among the city's purposes were the prevention of crime
and juvenile delinquency. 82
B. Electroshock Therapy and Privacy Rights
To what extent may an involuntarily committed mental
patient refuse electro-convulsive therapy (ECT)? The Kentucky
Court of Appeals faced this question in Gundy v. Pauley.84 Dessie
Gundy had been involuntarily committed to a state mental hos-
pital, but had not been judged incompetent to act on her own be-
half. The doctors at the mental institution asked Gundy to volun-
tarily submit to an ECT. Upon her refusal, the doctors filed suit
in Fayette County Circuit Court alleging that the ECT would be
in her "best interests." The trial court ordered Gundy to submit
to the ECT under a Department for Human Resources regula-
tion8S which authorizes ECT after a judicial determination that
"such treatment is in the best interest of the patient."8 6
Gundy appealed to the Kentucky Court of Appeals, alleging
that the Department for Human Resources regulation is ultra
vires because Kentucky Revised Statutes (KRS) section
202A.180(7)7 confers an absolute right to refuse such treatment.
ly relied upon these federal decisions for its opinion in Mr. Bs. Louisville has the power to
license and regulate advertising of the "sexually-oriented" adult entertainment activities,
since the content of such advertising falls outside absolute first amendment free speech
protections. See generally Walker v. City of Birmingham, 388 U.S. 307 (1978) (recogniz-
ing the power of city and local governments to regulate public places as a basis for sustain-
ing a temporary injunction prohibiting street demonstrations without a parade permit.);
Poulos v. New Hampshire, 345 U.S. 395 (1953) (holding as constitutional a city ordinance
which forbade religious meetings in a public park without a license.).
81 630 S.W.2d at 567.
82 See id.
8 Electro-convulsive therapy (ECT) is commonly referred to as electroshock ther-
apy. See 3 R. KAPLAN, W. FREEDMAN & R. SADOCK, COMPREHENSIVE TEXTBOOK OF PSYCHI-
ATRY ch. 31.5 (1980).
84 619 S.W.2d 730 (Ky. Ct. App. 1981). For a discussion of how this decision was
codified by the 1982 General Assembly, see text accompanying notes 103-08 infra.
8- 902 Ky. ADMIN. RECS. 12:020 (1981).
88 619 S.W.2d at 731 (emphasis added).
87 KRS § 202A.180(7) (repealed 1982).
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Further, Gundy complained that her constitutional right to pri-
vacy was violated by an order to submit to an ECT. The court of
appeals agreed with Gundy on the constitutional issue and dis-
missed the trial court's order of a forced ECT.8
The court in Gundy recognized a constitutionally-protected
right of privacy for a mental patient to "decide for himself
whether to submit to serious and potentially harmful medical
treatment."89 Although the court does not cite any specific state
or federal constitutional provisions, the opinion relies on three re-
cent decisions from other jurisdictions dealing with the rights of
mental patients in cases involving the forced administration of
mind-altering drugs. 90 This constitutional right of refusal ap-
88 619 S.W.2d at 731-32.
89 Id. at 731.
90 Id. (citing Rogers v. Okin, 634 F.2d 650 (1st Cir. 1980), vacated and remanded
sub nom. Mills v. Rogers, 102 S. Ct. 2442 (1982); Rennie v. Klein, 462 F. Supp. 1131
(D.N.J. 1978), modified and remanded 653 F.2d 836 (3d Cir. 1981); In re K.K.B., 609
P.2d 747 (Okla. 1980). See generally Developments in the Law-Civil Commitment of
the Mentally 111, 87 HARV. L. REv. 1190 (1974).
In Okin, a class which consisted of both voluntary and involuntary mental hos-
pital patients in Massachusetts sued the various defendants (mental hospital staff mem-
bers) over the forcible administration of mind-altering drugs. The First Circuit found a
fourteenth amendment due process right of privacy for the patients in refusing to submit
to the antipsychotic drugs. Id. at 653. The court in Okin asserts the "most likely" source
for the fourteenth amendment due process protection of the interest to make treatment
decisions is the penumbral right to privacy, bodily integrity or personal security. For sup-
port, the court cites Parham v. J.R., 442 U.S. 584, 626 (1979), Ingraham v. Wright, 430
U.S. 651 (1977); Breithaupt v. Abram, 352 U.S. 432 (1957); Rennie v. Klein, 462 F. Supp.
at 1131; Superintendent of Belchertown v. Saikewicz, 370 N.E.2d 417 (Mass. 1977).
The court held this "right" of privacy is not absolute, however, and the state may
order the treatment in either of two cases: where patients pose a threat to themselves or
others; or where patients have been declared incompetent and therefore cannot make a
decision on whether or not to refuse treatment. On the other hand, the state may choose to
recognize a privacy interest broader than that protected directly by the federal constitu-
tion. The United States Supreme Court, in vacating and remanding Okin, stated in Mills
v. Rogers, 102 S. Ct. at 2449 "[s]tate law may recognize liberty interests more extensive
than those independently protected by the Federal Constitution."
At present, Okin has been remanded for reconsideration in light of the decision in
the Matter of Guardianship of Richard Roe, fIII, 421 N.E.2d 40 (Mass. 1981). The
Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts held in Roe III that a noninstitutionalized in-
competent person has a protected liberty interest in "deciding for himself whether to sub-
mit to the serious and potentially harmful medical treatment that is represented by the ad-
mission of antipsychotic drugs." 421 N.E.2d at 51 n.9. It may well be possible that upon
reconsideration of Okin, the First Circuit will expand the privacy right rather than limit
it. For a discussion of limitations on the constitutional right to refuse treatment, see text
accompanying notes 91-100 infra.
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peared to be embodied in KRS section 202A. 180(7), which recog-
nized unspecified "rights of [mental] patients to refuse intrusive
treatments, including electroshock therapy."91 This statute, since
repealed,9 2 grants the Secretary of the Department for Human
Resources the power to make regulations for enforcement of the
unspecified right to refuse treatment; the regulation at issue in
Gundy was adopted under this authority. 93
The Kentucky Court of Appeals in Gundy noted, however,
that the rights embodied in KRS section 202A.180(7), are subject
to exceptions. The state has a compelling interest that outweighs
the individual mental patient's rights in two instances. 94 First,
the Kentucky court recognized the state's police power interest in
protecting other citizens or patients themselves from "immediate
danger" or "threat" of harm. 95 Second, the state has an interest in
acting as parens patriae for those who are declared incompetent
and cannot care for themselves. 96
Because the Department for Human Resources regulation
provides for required submission to an ECT upon a court order
that "such treatment is in the best interest of the patient,"'97 the
court of appeals invalidated this regulation.98 The court stated
that an involuntarily-committed mental patient could not be
compelled to undergo ECT "simply because it is considered to be
91 KRS § 202A.180(7) (1977) (emphasis added) (repealed 1982).
92 See notes 103-08 infra and accompanying text for a discussion of the 1982 legisla-
tion.
93 619 S.W.2d at 731.
94 These are the same two exceptions listed by the First Circuit Court in Okin. 634
F.2d at 654-58.
95 619 S.W.2d at 731.98 Id. In Okin, the First Circuit discussed the state's interests in more depth. Parens
patriae powers are powers of the sovereign to act as "the general guardian of all infants,
idiots, and lunatics." Hawaii v. Standard Oil Co., 405 U.S. 251, 257 (1972) (quoting 3 W.
BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *47). See Addington v. Texas, 441 U.S. 418, 426 (1979)
("state has a legitimate interest under its parens patriae powers in providing care to its cit-
izens who are unable because of emotional disorders to care for themselves"). For the state
to activate the parens patriae power, "the individual himself must be incapable of making
a competent decision concerning treatment on his own." 634 F.2d at 657. The Kentucky
Court of Appeals in Gundy likewise requires a prior determination that the involuntarily-
committed patient is incompetent, i.e., cannot act on his or her own volition. 619 S.W.2d
at 731.
97 902 Ky. ADMIN. REGS. 12:020(8) (1981).
98 619 S.W.2d at 731.
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in the best interest of the patient."09 Thus, the constitutional
right of privacy implicit in KRS section 202A.180(7) can be
superseded only upon showing of a compelling state interest.
Only upon a judicially-determined finding of incompetency or
an emergency (such as threat of violence or harm to self or
others) °0 can involuntarily-committed mental patients be sub-
jected against their will to an ECT.
The Kentucky Court of Appeals in Gundy echoes the senti-
ment of a few other jurisdictions'0 1 in holding that involuntarily-
committed mental patients have a constitutional right of privacy
to refuse ECT or mind-altering drugs supposedly provided for
their best interests. Even though involuntarily committed, the
patient has a right to "decide for himself whether to submit to
electroshock therapy."102 The court clearly struck a victory for
the rights of mental patients in Gundy v. Pauley.
In its 1982 session, the Kentucky General Assembly codified
the Gundy decision. The legislators repealed K.RS section
202A.180103 and rewrote this section, deleting some material, but
leaving the "right to refuse intrusive treatment" in new KRS sec-
tion 202A.191.14 In addition, KRS section 202A.196 115 was en-
acted to provide for hospital review committees in mental insti-
tutions. The purpose of these committees is to review an involun-
tarily-committed patient's refusal to undergo intrusive treat-
9 Id. at 731-32.
10 Id. at 731. See Rogers v. Okin, 634 F.2d at 650, for a discussion of when violent
propensities of a patient amount to an "emergency," thus allowing forcible administration
of drugs or ECT.
101 See the list of cases dealing with these privacy rights of mental patients in note 90
supra. In Gundy, Judge McDonald concurred specially to emphasize the "horrors" of
ECT. 619 S.W.2d at 732 (McDonald, J., concurring). The concurring opinion graphically
describes the ECT procedure and the potentially harmful physical side-effects. Judge
McDonald further states that the intrusiveness of ECT is so great as to require a strong
state interest, such as incompetency of the patient (thereby invoking the parens patriae
powers) or violent propensities towards self or others (thereby invoking the police powers).
Id.
102 Id. at 732 (McDonald, J., concurring).
103 KRS § 202A.180, repealed Act of Apr. 2, 1982, ch. 445, § 44, 1982 Ky. Acts
1648. In fact, the General Assembly overhauled and reorganized KRS chapter 202A. See
Act of Apr. 2, 1982, ch. 445, §§ 1-45, 1982 Ky. Acts 1629-48.
104 Act of Apr. 2, 1982, ch. 445, § 27, 1982 Ky. Acts 1638 (codified as KRS §
202A.191 (1983)).
10' Act of Apr. 2, 1982, ch. 445, § 28, 1982 Ky. Acts 1639.
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ments, such as ECT."01 If the committee approves such a treat-
ment plan and the patient refuses to follow it, then the commit-
tee meets with and counsels the patient. 10 7 If the patient still re-
fuses to participate in the treatment plan, the hospital may file a
petition in district court for a hearing on the appropriateness of
the plan. The victory for patient's rights in Gundy has been codi-
fied in the new KRS section 202A.196(3) which requires the
court to consider, among other factors, the competence of the pa-
tient to consent to treatment and the threat posed by the patient
if he or she is not treated. 108 The review committees in the hospi-
tal, along with the open door of the courts, should provide effec-
tive review of intrusive treatment plans.
C. Due Process and School Expulsions
1. Substantive Due Process
The Kentucky Court of Appeals was faced with a due pro-
cess'0° challenge to school expulsions in Clark County Board of
Education v. Jones. 110 The appellees, all members of the George
Rogers Clark High School Band, were found to have consumed
alcoholic beverages while on a school-sponsored trip to Murray,
Kentucky. Following a conference between the students and the
106 KRS § 202A.196(1) (1983).
107 Id. § 202A.196(2) (1983).
108 Id. § 202A.196(3) (1983). Further, this section gives the district courts certain
guidelines for conducting a hearing:
Within seven (7) days, the court shall conduct a hearing, consistent with the
patient's rights to due process of law, and shall utilize the following factors
in reaching its determination:
(a) Whether the treatment is necessary to protect other patients or the
patient himself from harm;
(b) Whether the patient is incapable of giving informed consent to the
proposed treatment;
(c) Whether any less restrictive alternative treatment exists; and
(d) Whether the proposed treatment carries any risk of permanent
side effects.
log For the text of the fourteenth amendment due process clause, see note 70 supra.
For excellent discussions of deprivation of liberty in a school setting, see Davis, The Goss
Principle, 16 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 289 (1979); Wilkinson, Coss v. Lopez: The Supreme
Court as School Superintendent, 1975 Sup. CT. RTv. 25.
'10 625 S.W.2d 586 (Ky. Ct. App. 1981).
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school's assistant principals, the students were suspended from
school and informed that a recommendation would be issued to
the superintendent that they should be expelled for the remain-
der of the school year."' Upon the superintendent's recommen-
dation, the Clark County Board of Education conducted a hear-
ing and decided to expel the students for the rest of the semes-
ter.12 Two of these students filed separate actions in the Clark
County Circuit Court, seeking injunctive relief against the
Board. "13
The trial court voided the high school regulation providing
that "suspension shall be mandatory for the first offense for the
use of . . . alcoholic beverages."114 Further, the trial court found
the Board's subsequent expulsion of the students was "arbi-
trary" 5 under the grounds and procedures for expulsion found in
KRS section 158.150116 because the Board failed to consider cer-
111 Id. at 588.
112 Id. Pursuant to KRS § 158.150(3) (Cum. Supp. 1982), the superintendent, prin-
cipal or head teacher may suspend students for violating certain disciplinary standards.
The Board of Education may expel a student, but only after opportunities for a hearing.
Id. For a discussion of the difference between expulsion and suspension, see text accom-
panying notes 128-29 infra.
113 625 S.W.2d at 587. The actions were consolidated for purposes of trial and ap-
peal. Id.
114 Id. at 588-89. The full Board regulation reads:
Suspension shall be mandatory on the first offense for the use of, possession
of, or trafficking in drugs or alcoholic beverages on school property, in tran-
sit to or from school, or at school functions, whether on or off school proper-
ty. Superintendent may recommend to the board of education that offenders
be expelled from school under the provisions of KRS 158.150.
Id. The trial court held that this regulation exceeded the suspension authority granted
high schools under KRS § 158.150 (Cum. Supp. 1982). Id. at 588. For the full text of KRS
§ 158.150, see note 116 infra.
"1 625 S.W.2d at 588.
116 KRS § 158.150 (Cum. Sup. 1982) provides:
(1) All pupils admitted to the common schools shall comply with the lawful
regulations for the government of the schools. Wilful disobedience or defi-
ance of the authority of the teachers or administrators, use of profanity or
vulgarity, assault or battery or abuse of other students, or school personnel,
the threat of force or violence, the use or possession of alcohol or drugs, steal-
ing or destruction or defacing of school property or personal property, the
carrying or use of weapons or dangerous instruments, or other incorrigible
bad conduct on school property as well as off school property at school spon-
sored activities constitutes cause for suspension or expulsion from school.
(2) A pupil shall not be suspended from the common schools until after at
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tain "factors" the court thought important. 117 The court ordered
the Board to readmit the students to the school and to provide
another hearing in which the students could introduce additional
proof."8 The Board refused to readmit the students and appealed
the adverse rulings to the Kentucky Court of Appeals.
The court of appeals reversed the trial court's voiding of the
Board's regulation."' KRS section 158.150(1) provides the same
causes for suspension as does the regulation, and the mandatory
suspension under the regulation did not exceed the authority
granted by the statute.120 However, the court of appeals upheld
least the following due process procedures have been provided:
(a) The pupil has been given oral or written notice of the charge or charges
against him which constitute cause for suspension;
(b) The pupil has been given an explanation of the evidence of the charge or
charges if the pupil denies them; and
(c) The pupil has been given an opportunity to present his own version of the
facts relating to the charge or charges. These due process procedures shall
precede any suspension from the common schools unless immediate suspen-
sion is essential to protect persons or property or to avoid disruption of the
ongoing academic process. In such cases, the due process procedures out-
lined above shall follow the suspension as soon as practicable, but no later
than three (3) school days after the suspension.
(3) The superintendent, principal, assistant principle or head teacher of any
school may suspend a pupil but shall report such action in writing immedi-
ately to the superintendent and to the parent, guardian or other person hav-
ing legal custody or control of the pupil. The board of education of any
school district may expel any pupil for misconduct as defined in subsection
(1), but such action shall not be taken until the parent, guardian or other
person having legal custody or control of the pupil has had an opportunity to
have a hearing before the board. The decision of the board shall be final.
117 The factors are: "the previous general conduct of the students involved; the aca-
demic standing of the students; the probability of a recurring violation; and the consider-
ation of alternative punishment or restrictions." 625 S.W.2d at 588.
118 Id.
'
9 Id. at 589.
120 For the text of KRS § 158.150, see note 116 supra. The court of appeals held that
the Board's regulation requiring mandatory suspension for one of the statutorily-provided
offenses was valid. The court stated that since the regulation only provided that "suspen-
sion, not expulsion, shall be mandatory for the first offense," it was a proper exercise of the
power to suspend under this regulation. 625 S.W.2d at 589. The Board has exclusive
power over the long-term expulsion process. No mandatory expulsions are provided, but
expulsion may be imposed only after the "hearing" as required under KRS § 158.150(3).
Since the controversy addressed in Jones concerns the substantive grounds of expulsion, it
is reasonable to assume that the court permits high school officials to exercise wide discre-
tion in the shorter-term suspension process.
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the trial court's finding that the Board acted arbitrarily in expell-
ing these students as a "finding of fact" supported by substantial
evidence. 121 In upholding the trial court's findings of "arbitrari-
ness," the court of appeals seems to have judicially amended KRS
section 158.150(1), which provides that consumption of alcoholic
beverages on school trips shall be grounds for expulsion. 1
2. Procedural Due Process
KRS section 158.150 was enacted in 1978, no doubt in re-
sponse to the United States Supreme Court's decision in Goss v.
Lopez.'12 In Goss, more than seventy-five students were sus-
pended during widespread student protests. 2 Although-the stu-
dents were suspended for different reasons, the suspensions all
occurred without a hearing. The Supreme Court held that stu-
dents have a procedural due process right'2 to protect their prop-
erty interest in a public education. The Court in Goss established
the following procedural due process guidelines for the suspen-
sion of a public high school student:
[Tihe student [shall] be given oral or written notice of the
charges against him and, if he denies them, an explanation of
the evidence the authorities have and an opportunity to pre-
sent his side of the story. The [due process] Clause requires at
least these rudimentary precautions against unfair or mistaken
findings of misconduct and arbitrary exclusion from the
school. 126
The Goss due process prerequisites for suspension have been
characterized as "an informal give and take between student and
disciplinarian."127 All that Goss and KRS sections 158.150(2) and
(3) provide are minimal "fair" procedures prior to suspension of
the student. This minimal due process, as codified in KRS section
121 625 S.W.2d at 588.
12 For the full text of KRS § 158.150, see note ll6supra.
'2 419 U.S. 565(1975).
4 Id. at 569.
12 Id. at 572-76.
16 Id. at 581.
127 Ingraham v. Wright, 430 U.S. at 695-96 (White, J., dissenting) (quoting Goss v.
Lopez, 419 U.S. at 583-84).
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158.150(2), provides protections in cases of suspension from high
schools. The parties did not question the suspension of the stu-
dents in Jones, possibly because the "conference" between the
students and principals was thought to satisfy the'Goss require-
ment of a minimal hearing. "
Suspension is a short-term exclusion from school, usually one
to ten days; 28 expulsion is a long-term dismissal from school,
more than ten days.'2 Only the Board of Education may expel
under KRS section 158.150(3). Neither Goss nor KRS section
158.150(3) specify what procedural due process is due in expul-
sion cases. Answers are found in several federal cases' 3 and even
in the Board's practice in Jones. 131 Thus, procedural due process
in expulsion cases is "more" due process-similar to trial proce-
dures.
128 The suspension-expulsion dichotomy appears in Goss. The suspension in Goss was
for 10 days and the Court considered it "a short suspension ... a far milder deprivation
than expulsion." 419 U.S. at 576. The Goss Court discussed the importance of education
and stated that "the total exclusion from the educational process for more than a trivial
period, and certainly if the suspension is for 10 days, is a serious event in the life of the sus-
pended child." Id. Further, in a footnote the Court discussed the holdings of the various
federal circuits concerning suspension and expulsions. Prior to Goss, several circuits held
that due process protections applied to expulsions (more than 10 days). Id. at 576-78 n.8.
See, e.g., Hagopian v. Knowlton, 470 F.2d 201 (2d Cir. 1972); Esteban v. Central Mo.
State College, 415 F.2d 1077 (8th Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 398 U.S. 965 (1970); Wasson v.
Trowbridge, 382 F.2d 807 (2d Cir. 1967). The reason the due process clause applies to
public education is that it is considered "property." See Board of Regents of State Colleges
v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564 (1972).
129 See Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S. at 576. Expulsions are longer-term deprivations of
property and therefore "more due process" attaches to this disciplinary process. In dictum,
the Goss Court rejected the use, in suspensions of 10 days or less, of counsel "to confront
and cross-examine witnesses supporting the charge, or to call [the student's] own witnesses
to verify his version of the incident .... To impose in each case even truncated trial-type
procedures might well overwhelm administrative facilities... [and] cost more than it
would save in educational effectiveness." Id. at 583. These procedures may be required for
the longer-term expusions.
13 0 See the cases listed in Goss at 576-78 n.8, e.g., Hagopian v. Knowlton, 470 F.2d
201,211 (2d Cir. 1972); Wasson v. Trowbridge, 382 F.2d 807, 812 (2d Cir. 1967). Indeed,
Goss was specifically limited to a "short" 10 day suspension: "We should also make it clear
that we have addressed ourselves solely to the short expulsion, not exceeding 10 days.
Longer suspensions or expulsions for the remainder of the school term, or permanently,
may require more formal procedures." 419 U.S. 584.
131 625 S.W.2d at 588. Consistent with the dictum of Goss "more due process," was
afforded the students at the expulsion hearing-witnesses were presented and counsel rep-
resented them. The statute merely requires "opportunity to have a hearing" for the parent
or guardian. See note 116supra.
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The due process defect found by the Kentucky Court of Ap-
peals in Jones was not the want of procedural due process af-
forded the students in the expulsion, but rather the substantive
grounds for the expulsion. In KRS section 158.150(1), the Ken-
tucky General Assembly provides the substantive grounds for
both suspension and expulsion. 1 2 The causes include alcohol use,
drug use or willful disobedience to school authority. The statute
does not, however, provide any guidelines for the school Board to
use in determining expulsions. By affirming the trial court's find-
ing that the Board acted "arbitrarily" in expelling the students,
the court of appeals judicially amended KRS section 158.150(1)
to include additional substantive considerations in determining
expulsions.
It is submitted that the grounds and evidence necessary to
suspend or expel a student, however, have been left by the legis-
lature to the local board's discretion. In Jones, the Kentucky
Court of Appeals acted in a quasi-legislative role when it con-
strued the statute to provide that school Boards in expulsion pro-
ceedings must consider "the previous general conduct of the stu-
dents involved; the academic standing of the students; the prob-
ability of a recurring violation; and the consideration of alterna-
tive punishment or restrictions."''a
The Kentucky Court of Appeals in Clark County Board of
Education v. Jones unfortunately failed to delineate the proce-
dural due process distinctions between suspensions and expul-
132 For the full text of KRS § 158.150, see note 116 supra. The first interpretation of
the constitutionality of the substantive grounds of the statute was Petrey v. Flaugher, 505
F. Supp. 1087 (E.D. Ky. 1981). In Petrey, the plaintiff was suspended and then expelled
pursuant to the statute for smoking marijuana at school. The plaintiff alleged substantive
due process violations in that expulsion "for the balance of the school year is a punish-
ment... excessive when weighed against his offense of smoking marijuana." Id. at 1088.
The court held that expulsion under KRS § 158.150 did not violate the student's substan-
tive due process rights in that "[t]here is no constitutional right, fundamental or otherwise,
to smoke marijuana in school. Nor, is there anything unconstitutional about having disci-
pline in a high school-even strict discipline." Id. at 1091. KRS § 158.150's punishments
are merely a part of the "traditions of our culture [to] recognize that due discipline in the
rearing of the young is necessary and wholesome, rather than a violation of personal
rights." 505 F. Supp. at 1091. Since the plaintiffs in Jones challenged only the "factors"
used in determining whether or not to order expulsion, the court of appeals does not cite
Perey.
1'3 625 S.W.2d at 588.
[Vol. 71
1982-83] ADMINISTRATIVE AND CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 443
sions and to clarify just how informal or formal each must be.
The court erred in the other direction, however, when it supplied
new substantive guidelines to be considered by the Kentucky
boards of education in expulsion cases.

